The global financial crisis of 2008-9 hit corporate defined benefit (DB) plans just as the new funding and other provisions of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 were being implemented. Both sponsors and the federal government reacted to the large shortfalls that developed. In this paper, the impacts and reactions are documented and the implications are evaluated. In particular, plans' funding status dropped dramatically, sponsors reduced risk in investments, increased contributions, and changed plan design, while premiums paid to the PBGC nearly doubled, and the federal government, through regulations and legislation, provided some temporary and/or conditional funding relief. Because the relief is temporary, and discount rates are projected to remain low, the shortfalls largely remain, dependent on future developments in financial markets. For the longer-term, the heightened appreciation for risk, as affecting both DB and defined contribution plans, has led to proposals for a new, more flexible, DB-like plan type called the flexible structured plan and other changes in government policies.
This chapter discusses how corporate DB plans fared during the global financial crisis, and how the main actors reacted. We begin with a detailed timeline of legislative and regulatory temporary funding relief. We also review a reform proposal that arose out of this environment and experience recommending a new type of retirement plan and other changes in government policies.
The background
To illustrate the backdrop against which this analysis unfolds, Figure 
Figures 1 and 2 here
As the figures show, while equity returns were volatile in 2007, they were modestly positive. Beginning in 2008, however, larger losses began to accrue and September through November saw extremely large declines in prices. For the year, losses reached nearly 40 percent.
January and February 2009 saw continued large losses, but then confidence was restored in the financial markets and, overall, the equity market in 2009 had a gain of more than 25 percent.
There was continued volatility in 2010, but, on net, there was again a gain, at over 15 percent.
Yields on high-grade corporate bonds generally follow those on long-maturity Treasury bonds, and were increasing through mid-year 2007 and then began to decline with the onset of the recession. In 2008, however, that relationship broke, as spreads widened dramatically.
Treasury bond yields fell while corporate bond yields rose dramatically in the depth of the financial crisis to nearly 8 percent (end October 2008) : during this period, investors doubted the creditworthiness of even the highest rated corporate issuers. Thereafter, corporate yields declined 
Impact on corporate pension funding status
The funding status of DB plans is calculated as the ratio of the market value of plan assets to liabilities (formally, the projected benefit obligation or PBO) for financial accounting year-end disclosures. This is the most immediate and sensitive summary measure of the plan's benefit security level, and it is widely cited and used. Figure 3 shows the history of the funding status of the DB plans of Fortune 1000 companies 2000-10, on an aggregate basis (total of all plan assets divided by total of all plan liabilities) and also as a simple average across the companies (average of individual company pension asset-liability ratios). In 2000, the overall funding status was quite high at 124 percent, but it dropped during the dot-com bust and the was also an increase in asset values; the estimated aggregate status was 83 percent in 2010 and average was 82 percent. Note that when the aggregate funding measure was uniformly higher than the average, it meant that larger plans were better funded than smaller plans. 
Figure 4 here

Pension plan investments
Perhaps the easiest and most direct way for a plan to control cost and risk in its DB plan is through asset allocation. A higher allocation to equities lowers the plan sponsor's expected cost but also increases its risk, especially in the sense of more volatile required cash contributions. When DB plans are active and growing, equity investments make particularly good sense, as assets that increase with economic growth match liabilities that likewise increase with growth (more workers and higher wages). When DB plans are no longer growing or are closed or frozen -and mainly pay out benefits -many experts say that a better match obtains when debt securities are the primary investment. These considerations should hold regardless of whether there is a bull or bear stock market. Even sophisticated professional and institutional investors, however, might be influenced by unusual realizations of risk, such as occurred during the global financial crisis. Overall, as we shall see, there has been a movement away from equity investments for DB plans. This pattern was apparent before the crisis, but it was deepened as a result. target-date and balance funds are popular and growing, these still represent a distinct minority of assets and investors in DC plans. And it appears that most DC plan participants were passive investors and did not automatically rebalance their allocations. Indeed the equity share in DC plans followed stock market movements closely over time, with some hint of an upward secular trend in the equity share. Overall the equity share of DC plans has generally been higher than for DB plans, and in 2010, it was almost 20 percentage points higher than for DB plans. 
Figure 6 here
According to McFarland and Warshawsky (2010) allocations will also change in that direction.
Contribution patterns
Another way in which DB sponsors can react to financial market developments is through employer contributions to help fund the plan. The federal government sets a lower bound to these contributions, which it moves from time to time (Warshawsky, 2007) . In particular, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) implemented a regime whereby market conditions were ultimately better reflected in plans' regulatory funded status, and minimum required contributions were linked more explicitly and quickly to that status than in the past.
These requirements are quite complex, and during the global financial crisis, they were temporarily altered to reduce the otherwise large minimum contributions that would otherwise have been required. At the same time, plan sponsors can contribute more than the minimum if it fits their business strategy and financial wherewithal; one of the accomplishments of PPA was to allow these extra contributions on a tax deductible basis to a much greater extent than did prior law. Contributions can be either cash or employer securities (the latter within legal limits), but in practice the vast majority of contributions are made in cash. 3 There is evidence that many plan sponsors do pursue the strategy of contributing more than the minimum required. 
DB plan sponsorship and design
The long-term trend in sponsorship of active DB plans by large corporations represented here by the list of Fortune 100 companies from 1998 through May of 2011 appears in Table 2 .
These are, in turn, divided into traditional final-average-pay and career-average-pay plans on the one hand, and hybrid plans, mainly cash balance plans, on the other. Clearly, since 2004 the trend has been away from DB plans, particularly traditional plans. Although the trend continued and even accelerated in subsequent years, we do not sense that the global financial crisis per se caused that acceleration, despite the rapid drop-off in funded status in 2008 and increase in future funding obligations. Rather, it appears to be is a continuation of a pre-existing trend. (2009) showed that the announcement of a freeze or close generally led to slightly lower share prices for the plan sponsor, rather than an increase. Standard terminations of plans will take the risks off the books of plan sponsors, but they are expensive: the funding gaps must be made up immediately, and the extra charges by the insurer issuers of group annuity contracts to take on the accrued pension liabilities must be paid.
The obverse of risk exposure to the plan sponsor is risk protection for employees who better appreciate DB plans after a financial crisis (Towers Watson, 2010a) . Moreover, once a decision has been made to move away from the DB plan, it may take several months or even years before it is implemented, owing to administrative, legal, and labor relations issues that must be managed. So there is reason to expect no sudden movements in DB plan sponsorship trends owing to the global financial crisis. Nevertheless, market events that highlight risk are likely to have an impact eventually. Prior to the financial crisis, plan sponsors said 'risk' was the most important reason given for a plan freeze or close (Watson Wyatt Worldwide, 2008) . By all accounts, the global financial crisis was a realization of risk far beyond normal expectationsconsiderably beyond one standard deviation. Accordingly, ways to reduce risk while keeping the essence of the DB plan are likely to be more seriously explored and perhaps adopted.
Plan design is yet another important option for risk management (Pang and Warshawsky, 2011b) . Cash balance hybrid plans represent less risk to a plan sponsor than traditional DB plans, in that for the latter, liabilities fluctuate with salary increases and service years. Moreover, these liabilities are also highly sensitive to changes in interest rates. By contrast, liability variations are mitigated in cash balance plans by their accrual formulas: usually the cash balance benefits are expressed as account balances at retirement, and the pay credit rate is fixed (e.g., 6 percent of pay). Cash balance accruals do vary with new realizations of crediting interest rates; for instance the 30-year Treasury bond yield is a frequently-used crediting rate. In addition, liabilities for cash balance accounts are typically less interest rate-sensitive because the duration is shorter (account balances are usually paid out as a lump sum upon termination or retirement) and because of the internal partial hedging of the benefit accrual (being dependent on interest rate levels) and the liability. For example, declines in discount rates will increase the computed liability of a cash balance plan but will also gradually reduce plan benefits through lower interest credits. Pang and Warshawsky conclude that the cash balance plan has less expected volatility than the traditional DB plan and only slightly higher average cost, for the same 60/40 equity/bond investment strategy.
This lower risk may explain why hybrid plans have maintained a steadier share of plan sponsorship than traditional DB plans for Fortune 100 companies. The legitimization of these plans by PPA, after years of legal and political controversy, undoubtedly also played a part in steadying the overall environment for their sponsorship (Clark, Glickstein, and Hill, 2012) . 9 Table 3 here
Temporary funding relief from the government
The PBGC single-employer insurance program
The corporate DB pension sector in the US is protected by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). For several reasons, it is to be expected that the global financial crisis would have hurt this entity's assets and liabilities, and also increased the number of terminated underfunded DB pension plans resulting from corporate bankruptcies. This did occur, but perhaps to a lesser extent than what one might have expected given the severity of losses in financial markets and the depth of the overall recession. 
Figure 7 here
As also seen in Figure 7 , the return on the PBGC investment portfolio is somewhat volatile and reflects financial market conditions. During 2008-09, the PBGC increased its exposure to the equity market, but then in 2010 it brought that exposure back down. These changes reflect mainly changes in the PBGC Board's investment policy determined by its trustees, the Secretaries of Labor, Treasury and Commerce, and as suggested by the Executive Director.
The 2012 proposed federal government budget released by President Obama in February 2011 included a plan to increase PBGC premiums to make them reflect the riskiness of the pension plan and the plan sponsor, and to give the PBGC Board the authority to set the premium rate. The budget indicated that this proposal would raise $16 billion over 10 years, although it would not start for two years. Assuming that the stated increase in revenues represented just an increase in premiums (no details were given), this would represent nearly a doubling in annual premiums from current levels.
Reform proposals
Another way to reduce risk imposed on plan sponsors is to change certain laws that currently constrain risk management in, and therefore increase the risk of, DB plans. where several proposals were presented, emphasizing new third-party institutions and the DC approach (Kessler and Peterson, 2010) .
Another such proposal offers a new type of single-or multiple-employer retirement plan, namely something called a flexible structured plan (Warshawsky, 2010) . It has the basic features of a DB plan, but the plan sponsor can cut back benefits according to a specified legal rule if the plan funding falls severely, and it must increase benefits if plan funding rises significantly. No reversion of excess assets would be allowed here. This type of plan is intended to share investment risk and return between employers and employees. The proposal would also apply a uniform standard of benefit adequacy on plan design and operation based on certified retirement saving models, with appropriate differentiation for the different plan types, with the structure intended to encourage guaranteed benefits. Non-discrimination requirements could then be eliminated as essentially redundant, according to the proposal. Other changes in plan rules and provisions include a reform of the reversion tax for DB (both traditional and hybrid) plans, intended to right the risk imbalance inherent in the sponsorship of these plans currently.
Additionally PBGC accounting for its liabilities would be revamped, to improve transparency.
The various limits on benefits and contributions to plans would be indexed to wages rather than prices -it is claimed that this is policy consistent with sensible plan design because plans are intended to replace pre-retirement wages, not prices, and because the relative position of plan limits in the income distribution is more likely to be maintained, rather than slowly erode, keeping the active interest of sponsor owners and executives.
Role of the employer. Unlike some other recent proposals, this proposal builds on the current employer-based system; accordingly the current voluntary nature of the second-tier retirement system would continue. Retirement plan sponsorship would not be required by employers, nor would a plan need to be fully paid by employers. Accordingly, incentives under the proposal are designed to be consistent with the encouragement of plan sponsorship, as well as adequate and secure benefits; the goal is to produce an even playing-field among plan types, while assuring plan participants and broader society that their needs and concerns are also addressed. An important consideration and even constraint for its success would be a continued sustainable interest by employers in retirement plans.
The flexible structure plan has the basic features of a DB plan and therefore the retirement benefits would be specified. The sponsor, however, would be allowed to implement certain specified benefit cutbacks, across the board in percentage terms, to all participants not currently receiving payments from the plan or not older than the plan's normal retirement age, from the currently indicated level of benefits, if the plan funding, specially defined, fell below certain thresholds. As a counterpart, plan improvements, again distributed evenly and proportionately across the board to participants not receiving benefits, would be required from the current benefit level if the plan funding increased above certain thresholds. No reversions of excess pension assets would be allowed for this plan type.
Any unilateral or bargained improvements in future benefit accruals for a flexible structure plan, unrelated to funding status, could be made proportionally among participants, not favoring any group, on a going-forward basis. Benefit improvements for past service, however, could only be made if they were funded fully. Benefit cutbacks would not be allowed except in response to declines in funding status.
For this purpose, funded status would be defined as the ratio of plan assets to plan liabilities, where the present value of benefits accrued to participants receiving payments or older than the plan's retirement age is subtracted from both the numerator and denominator. Plan assets and liabilities would otherwise follow the definitions and valuation requirements in current law.
The cutback/enhancement regime for this plan type has several elements. Within a corridor of funding statuses around the current plan liability (say, 80-120 percent), the current funding requirements operate; that is, normal cost must be covered, any shortfalls must be amortized over seven years, but no benefit improvements are required. The corridor provides stability of benefits to plan participants most of the time, while imposing only modest volatility on plan sponsors. If the funding status were to fall below the corridor, the benefit liability may be reduced, according to a rule considered below (flexible). Normal cost is still paid, and the corridor is reset around the new liability. Benefit reductions are limited: if the current liability falls below 50 percent of the initial liability, there can be no further cuts, and contributions must be made to amortize losses so that at least 50 percent of the initial liability will be paid to plan participants. Above the corridor, benefit improvements must be made, again according to one of the rules discussed below; the rules generally give symmetrical treatment to cuts and improvements. The new liability is calculated and the corridor is moved around it. Finally, normal cost relates to the current accruals of the plan, which are dependent on the plan's fixed design (structured) and not to its funding status. The plan would offer a life annuity as a distribution option.
Contributions would be made by the employer in the new plan type. Mandatory employee contributions would not be allowed because the participants do not control the plan investments.
As a retirement instrument where the worker shares to some extent the results of the plan's performance, voluntary employee contributions to the plan would be allowed to purchase extra benefits, on a tax-deductible basis, comparable to the treatment of 401(k) plans.
This proposal considers alternative cutback/enhancement rules (regimes), with somewhat different risk-sharing properties. One possibility would set the corridor at 80-120 percent; if outside the corridor, cuts and increases in benefits would be made pari-passu with funding status changes below or above the corridor (that is, according to the distance outside the corridor). For example, if the funding status fell to 75 percent of the current liability, a 5 percent cut could be made to the benefits, and the corridor would move downward around the new, lower, benefit liability. Normal cost must be paid, as well as any amortizations of past losses. Cuts may continue to be made, as warranted by funding status changes, but benefits cannot fall below 50 percent of the initial promise. If the funding status rose to, say, 130 percent, a 10 percent 'permanent' increase to benefits must be made, and the corridor would move upward around the new benefit liability. 10 It is therefore argued that this change could reduce the risk inherent in the sponsorship of these plans currently, perhaps renewing the interest by plan sponsors in DB plans.
In the context of the overall proposal, the change in excise tax is intended to help achieve 'an even playing field' in the costs, burdens and advantages for sponsors and participants among the three plan types in the new, reformed, retirement system.
The team has also explored having the PBGC use market interest rates as the discount rate used to value its obligations (instead of the current practice of basing it on insurance industry surveys). Specifically the idea is to use the high-grade corporate bond spot 'yield' curve calculated by the Treasury Department in a highly transparent manner, with appropriate adjustments for agency expenses, to arrive at good estimates of group annuity prices, to be used in calculating the finances of the PBGC, both income statement and balance sheet. The purpose of this change is to bring more transparency and accuracy to the accounting for the insurance program. And finally, the proposal posits that the indexation of the various limits on all types of qualified retirement plans should be made to the average wage computed by Social Security, rather than the consumer price index. In addition, levels should be increased as Social Security is reformed, presumably becoming even more progressive, to maintain a fair balance between public and private programs for retirement.
Conclusion
The been required. In any case, the relief was temporary and required contributions will increase significantly for the foreseeable future unless discount rates rise significantly or asset markets boom.
Clearly there remains much risk and fragility in financial markets and the economy, perhaps more than countenance prior to the global financial crisis. Plan sponsors are reluctant to bear the entire risk burden, yet workers and retirees still want structured benefits and desire guaranteed benefits. Accordingly to encourage the activities of plan sponsors, and to better managing risk, fairly, and efficiently, while still providing structured benefits to workers, it is useful to evaluate new plan designs that can more fairly and efficiently spread the risk burden between sponsors and workers. Ultimately the goal would be to ensure that workers can retire at appropriate ages in reasonable comfort and at reasonable cost. classes, on a quarterly basis. As of this writing, the most recent data available is for third quarter 2010. A drawback to this source is that single-employer and multiemployer plans are reported together, although assets of single-employer plans generally represent more than three quarters of the total for DB plans. Another drawback is that these data are estimated from various underlying sources; the estimates change for several quarters until no further revisions are made.
The second information source, from disclosures in the annual financial reports of corporate plan sponsors, provides detailed data on asset holdings by class and valuation methodology on an annual basis. Recent changes in financial accounting standards made these disclosures more granular and accurate. Yet one drawback is that the data are reported and collected with a lag;
another is that the collections do not represent the universe of single-employer plans. As of this writing, the most recent financial disclosure data are available for year-end 2009 for Fortune 1000 companies (collected by Towers Watson). Despite their differences, the two sources are largely consistent in the story they tell about trends, changes, and the influence of the global financial crisis on DB plan investments.
2 These are the Fortune 1000 companies with calendar year financial statements for which Towers Watson has consistently obtained data.
3 Kummernuss, McFarland, and Warshawsky (2010) offer evidence that contributions of employer securities actually declined during the global financial crisis.
the third segment rate mandated by PPA for valuing benefits starting in 15 or more years, and overall computed values are subject to the asset corridor test, that is, that the actuarial asset value must fall within 90-110 percent of the fair market value.
7 Pang and Warshawsky (2009b) assume that most plan sponsors elected to use the market value of assets in their required funding calculation and a smoothed actuarial value of liabilities (as allowed by PPA), using three segment discount rates averaged over the past 24 months. This is because plan sponsors did not want to use the simple 25-month average of past asset values without also gaining the ability to assume some expected investment return over the averaging period on the expectation that generally market prices, particularly of equities, tend to rise over 9 It should also be noted that multiemployer plans were also subject to new PPA requirements and got considerable funding relief (Mazo and Greenblum, 2012) .
10 A specific provision in the overall proposal intended to encourage the maintenance of guaranteed DB plans (not applied to flexible structured plans) is also modeled by Pang and Warshawsky (2009a) , which would lower the excise tax rate to 20 percent (instead of the current 50 percent) and allow excess asset reversions to employers for DB plans funded at least at 120 percent of their liabilities. As in current law, sponsors would have to fully vest accrued benefits if they took reversions, though they would not have to terminate their plans. Also, the proposal includes a lower excise tax rate -15 percent -on asset reversions in bankruptcy, instead of the 20 percent under current law. The excise tax rate chosen reflects some past research that finds the rate needed to capture the corporate income tax otherwise avoided by the exclusion of pension fund investment income from taxation. Corporate income taxes would also need to be paid on the asset reversions. The model results indicate that a more moderate excise tax rate together with a reasonable funding threshold for asset reversions would enable sponsors to spend the excess funds on other corporate needs, thereby lowering the cost of sponsorship of DB plans.
It would also open a considerable revenue source for the government, with only a small increase in bankruptcy cost for the PBGC.
